Introduction
Gottlob Frege is notorious for having rejected, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the then-emerging methodology for independence-and consistency-proofs in mathematics. The target of Frege's criticism was primarily the use of that methodology in David Hilbert's classic Foundations of Geometry. Because Hilbert's methods were undoubtedly successful, and differ only in detail from our own contemporary means of demonstrating consistency and independence, Frege's critical stance here has struck some as simply short-sighted or worse. 1 See e.g. Dummett [1975] , Resnik [1973/4] , Currie [1982a] 2 Blanchette [1996] eliminated with the greatest care can we say with certainty upon what primitive truths the proof depends …
If we now try to meet this demand, we very soon come to propositions which cannot be proved so long as we do not succeed in analyzing concepts which occur in them into simpler concepts or in reducing them to something of greater generality. Now here it is above all Number which has to be either defined or recognized as indefinable. This is the point which the present work is meant to settle. On the outcome of this task will depend the decision as to the nature of the laws of arithmetic. 4 The idea that the truths in question "cannot be proved so long as we do not succeed in analyzing concepts which occur in them," but can in principle be proven once such an analysis has been given, is the motivation for the central work of the Grundlagen. Frege's strategy here is to show how such claims as "every natural number has a successor" can be shown to follow from purely logical principles once such central notions as natural number and successor have been broken down into simpler components.
It's not just proof from principles of logic (as in Grundgesetze) that is facilitated by analysis; for Frege, the provability in general of a proposition from particular premises can often be demonstrated only after the right analysis has been performed. To have a clear example in front of us, we'll look briefly at an analysis and proof offered by Frege in [1881] . The relevant passage begins (with our labels inserted for later reference):
I wish to prove the theorem that (SUM) the sum of two multiples of a number is in its turn a multiple of that number. … The numbers whose multiples are to be considered are subject to no conditions other than that the following addition theorems:
(P1) (∀m)(∀n)(∀p)((m+n)+p = m+(n+p)) and (P2) (∀n)(n = n+0) hold for them. 5 4 Frege [1884] p. 5. On Frege's use here of the word "definition," see section 3 below. 5 (P1) and (P2) are formulas (1) and (2) respectively of Frege's [1881] . (SUM) is Frege's own natural-language rendering of the claim to be proven; see [1881] p. 27. Addition and zero are left unanalyzed in (P1) and (P2).
As Frege notes, the result is an interesting one, since the premises (P1) and (P2) are, on the surface at least, surprisingly weak by comparison with the conclusion (SUM) to be demonstrated. Having announced the project, Frege gives his reader a careful analysis of the relation "multiple-of," to the effect that a number n is a multiple of a iff n follows 0 in the "+a" series, with "following in the … series" cashed out as in Begriffsschrift, and "0" and "+" left unanalyzed. We thereby obtain a highly-analyzed version of what is expressed by (SUM), presented via a complex formula which we'll abbreviate as:
That is: if m follows 0 in the "+a"-series, and n follows 0 in that series, then (m+n) does too. (SUM′) is then the sentence which Frege derives from (P1) and (P2) with his usual painstaking rigor.
In this brief example we have an illustration of Frege's standard procedure, marked by the following two points which will concern us below:
(i) Frege standardly discusses the theorem he is going to prove and, after the fact, the theorem he has proven, in ordinary language, speaking for example in terms of (SUM), and talking about ordinary arithmetical truths, as the things established by his proofs. But the propositions he actually proves are generally the results of a non-trivial analysis of the propositions casually discussed. This leads to the following question: Does Frege in fact take e.g. the sentences (SUM) and (SUM′) to express the same proposition, so that he is to be taken at his word when he speaks for example of his proof of (SUM′) as constituting a proof of (SUM)? (Here it is important to keep in mind that for Frege, the objects of proof are not the sentences displayed, but rather the nonlinguistic propositions expressed by those sentences.) Or are we to take him to be speaking somewhat more loosely in such cases, so that analysandum-sentence and analysanssentence express importantly-similar, rather than identical, propositions? As we will see below, Frege is not entirely clear on this point. What is clear, and what will be crucial for our purposes, is that Frege takes it that the two propositions are sufficiently similar that they share logical grounds and entailments. In order to demonstrate that a mathematical truth follows from a given collection of premises, it suffices to prove an analyzed version of that truth from (analyzed versions of) those premises. This is the assumption behind all of Frege's foundational work, in which the logical grounds of mathematical truths are established by giving excruciatingly-careful proofs of their highly-analyzed counterparts.
(ii) Frege's strategy always involves two strictly-distinct stages. The first is analysis: the components of the mathematical truths in question are broken down into simpler constituents, thereby revealing a more-complex structure for those truths. The second stage is proof: the now-analyzed truths are proven via strict, step-by-step proofs that follow the rules of Frege's formal system. An important point for us is that the conceptual analyses themselves make no appearance within the proofs proper; we do not find any claimed equivalence between analysandum and analysans within the context of proof. The only version of a mathematical proposition that shows up in a proof is the analysans; the analysandum is left behind, and appears only in those natural-language discussions which precede and succeed the proof itself.
Two Kinds of Definition
One point which will be important to mark out before looking more closely at Frege's procedure is his dual use of the term "definition," and its connection to the Fregean distinction between sentence and thought.
Frege is, again, concerned primarily not with linguistic items like sentences, but rather with the nonlinguistic items expressed by sentences. Called thoughts after 1891, these latter are the items between which the logical relations obtain, and they are the objects of proof.
When one uses the phrase "prove a proposition'' in mathematics, then by the word "proposition'' we clearly mean not a sequence of words or a group of signs, but a thought; something of which one can say that it is true. keep terminology straight, let us call such a series of sentences a "derivation," and call the series of thoughts expressed a "proof." The final sentence of a derivation, then, expresses the thought proven.
In a Fregean derivation, each sentence is either a logical axiom of the formal system, an assumed premise (clearly marked as such), a definition, or a formal consequence of previous sentences in the derivation via a rule of inference of the system. Frege is extremely explicit and careful regarding the role of definitions: a definition that appears within a formal derivation is always a stipulation of notational convention; it merely announces an abbreviative convention, and is entirely eliminable.
8 Any thought
provable from a given set of assumed premise-thoughts via the use of definitions is also (Frege [1980] p. 36); also [1914] ([1979] 208): "it is not possible to prove something new from a definition alone that would be unprovable without it." and "…considered from a logical point of view, [definition] stands out as something wholly inessential and indispensable." 9 See e.g. [1884] §87: "I hope I may claim in the present work to have made it probable that the laws of arithmetic are analytic judgements and consequently a priori. Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development of logic, and every proposition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit a derivative one." Also [1893] §0: "In my Grundlagen der Arithmetik I sought to make it plausible that arithmetic is a branch of logic and need not borrow any ground of proof whatever from either experience or intuition. In the present book this shall now be confirmed, by the derivation of the simplest laws of Numbers by logical means alone."
We have a simple sign with a long established use. We believe that we can give a logical analysis of its sense, obtaining a complex expression which in our opinion has the same sense. … … The effect of the logical analysis of which we spoke will then be precisely thisto articulate the sense clearly. Work of this kind is very useful; it does not, however, form part of the construction of the system, but must take place beforehand.
10
This is the kind of analytic work discussed above, in which Frege "defines" for example the notion of multiple of m in terms of the ancestral of the +m-relation. It is also the work that forms the heart of Grundlagen and which sets the stage for Grundgesetze. The "analysis" or "definition" of cardinal number, for example, in terms of the extensions of second-level concepts, is part of the work that as Frege says "take[s] place beforehand."
These expressions of analysis, Frege says at one point, ought strictly speaking not to be called "definitions," since they are not mere terminological stipulations; nevertheless, he does on occasion use the term in this colloquial way, sometimes clarifying by referring to these things as "analytic definitions."
11 The separation between the two kinds of definition, however, is strict: only definitions of the empty, stipulative kind appear in derivations; those of the analytic kind are the ones that express the results of interesting mathematical or philosophical conceptual work, and never appear in derivations.
Content and Form in Frege and Hilbert
Because the analyses that Frege offers are typically directed at the contents of particular non-logical terms (e.g. of such terms as "natural number," "successor,"
"multiple-of," etc.), the contents of those terms is all-important. That (SUM) follows logically from (P1) and (P2) Hilbert's means of demonstrating relative consistency and independence is the nowfamiliar "reinterpretation" method: to show that a sentence A is independent of a set S of sentences, Hilbert provides the geometric terms in S and in A with new interpretations taken from a background theory of real numbers, interpretations on the basis of which A expresses a falsehood, while S's members all express truths. Assuming the consistency of the background theory, this shows that A is not logically entailed, in Hilbert's sense, by S. 13 The crucial point, for our purposes, is that this conception of logical entailment is one which holds entirely independently of the contents of the non-logical terms. As Hilbert explains, …it is surely obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be thought of in any way one likes. If in speaking of my points I think of some system of things, e.g. the system: love, law, chimney-sweep … and then assume all my axioms as relations between these things, then my propositions, e.g. Pythagoras' theorem, are also valid for these things. In other words: any theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements.
14 It is of the essence of Hilbert's procedure that the question of what is logically entailed by a set of sentences has nothing to do with the specific meanings had by its non-logical terms; they can take any of a variety of meanings, or indeed can remain empty, without affecting the logical implications of the set. Logical implication, for Hilbert (in Foundations of Geometry) supervenes on form.
The upshot of this difference is that Hilbert's entailment-relation is strictly stronger than Frege's, in the following sense: If a sentence A is entailed in Hilbert's sense by a set S of sentences, then the thought expressed by A is entailed in Frege's sense by the set of thoughts expressed by S. But not conversely. A can well fail to be entailed in Hilbert's sense by S despite the fact that the thought expressed by A is entailed in Frege's sense by the members of S. This will happen whenever the latter entailment is due to the meanings of the non-logical terms in A and/or in S, in the kind of way which, as Frege understands it, can be brought out by conceptual analysis. Note for example that the sentence (SUM) is independent, in the sense used by Hilbert in Foundations of Geometry, from the sentences (P1) and (P2), though of course the thought expressed by the first of these is, from Frege's point of view, logically entailed by the thoughts expressed by the latter pair.
15
The fact that a sentence A is independent, in Hilbert's sense, from a set S of sentences is therefore no guarantee that the thought expressed by A is independent, in Frege's sense, from the set of thoughts expressed by the members of S. Whenever a conceptual analysis is required in order to bring to light the relevant logical complexity, Frege's work.
5.i Hilbert on Conceptual Analysis
As Hodges points out, Hilbert takes conceptual analysis, at various times, to be an important tool in the investigation of logical properties and relations. The central passage for Hodges is the following, from Hilbert-Ackerman 1928, whose purpose is to point out the superiority of the full first-order predicate calculus over its monadic fragment. (I've inserted Hodges' numbering at various points, for later reference.)
The sentence [earlier discussed] read "If there is a son, then there is a father." The symbolic rendering of this statement in the predicate calculus is:
S(x) stands for "x is a son," and F(x) for "x is a father." A proof of this statement is possible only if we analyze conceptually the meanings of the two predicates which occur. In the concept "son" is contained the property "male," on the one hand, and, on the other, the relation of child to parents; in the concept "father," the relation to wife and child.
Accordingly, if we introduce for "x is male" the symbol M(x) and render the predicate "x and y are the parents of z" (or more exactly, "x and y as husband and wife have z as their child") by the symbol C(x,y,z), then we define S(x) by
("x is a son" means "x is male, and there is a u and there is a v such that u as husband and v as wife are the parents of x.") Likewise F(x) is defined by (∃y)(∃z)C(x,y,z).
("x is a father" means "There is a y and there is a z such that x and y as husband and wife are the parents of z.")
If we introduce the expressions obtained for S(x) and F(x), the above assertion assumes the form:
At this point, Hilbert and Ackermann go on to point out the provability of this last formula.
Here we see Hilbert's interest in, and use of, conceptual analysis when enquiring into questions of provability. As Hodges sees it, this is one reason to take my account of terms as "point," "between," etc. His concern is exclusively with the general axiomatic framework within which different such contents can be fitted. The consistency-question of 1899 has explicitly to do with the satisfiability of such general frameworks, which is to say that it has to do entirely with the forms of the axiom-sets in question, and not with their specific subject-matter. No conceptual analysis can have any bearing on the questions he asks here. Rather than indicating a significant change in view regarding conceptual analysis in general, the difference between the 1899 consistency-proofs and the brief 1928 passage marks a difference between two entirely different kinds of project.
In any case, the issue of the evolution of Hilbert's views on conceptual analysis is beside the point with respect to our current concern. For this much is beyond controversy: that Hilbert's 1899 consistency-demonstrations establish a kind of consistency that holds independently of the meanings, if any, of the non-logical terms appearing in the sentences in question. No conceptual analysis of any specific meanings those terms might have is relevant to the consistency-questions he raises (and answers) there.
5.ii Analysis and Entailment
Once again, the role of conceptual analysis in Frege's work, as I have sketched it, is to help reveal relations of logical entailment which hold in virtue of content, and hence which aren't immediately evident on the basis of the surface structure of the pre-analytic sentences in question. The analysis of what is expressed by a sentence A can yield a new, more highly-structured sentence A′; the subsequent derivation of A′ from premises shows, as Frege sees it, that the original thought expressed by A follows logically from those premises. This, I take it, is the use to which Frege puts analysis in all of his foundational work.
Hodges, however, argues that we should not see conceptual analysis in Frege's work as a means of revealing logical connections that already obtain (perhaps unnoticed) between the thoughts in question. We should instead take Frege's analyses as providing new thoughts, new "axioms" which express the newly-discovered conceptual connections.
We can illustrate the difference as follows, taking as our example the transitivity of the relation of equinumerosity. Given these three sentences,
we can ask whether (the thought expressed by) (E3) follows logically from (the thoughts expressed by) the pair of (E1) and (E2). For Frege, the answer turns on an analysis of the sense of "equinumerous" in terms of 1-1 mappings. 18 As I have portrayed Frege's general procedure above, the analysis will yield sentences This is the case discussed by Hilbert and Ackermann. We analyse 'son' and 'father,' and we see ('by an immediate insight,' as Frege puts it) that the definitions of these concepts in terms of M and C are true. In this case it is not at all clear to me why Frege should regard (1.8) and (1.7) as expressing the same thoughts, since the two definitions (1.11), which are needed to get from one of (1.7) and (1.8) to the other, express significant thoughts and not just a notational convenience. But the key point in this case is that Frege regards the conceptual analysis not as providing new sentences s′ and Σ′ to express the same thoughts as before, but as supplying a new premise in the form of an axiom expressing a relation between concepts. We have a simple sign with a long established use. We believe that we can give a logical analysis of its sense, obtaining a complex expression which in our opinion has the same sense. We can only allow something as a constituent of a complex expression if it has a sense we recognize. The sense of the complex expression must be yielded by the way in which it is put together.
That it agrees with the sense of the long established simple sign is not a matter for arbitrary stipulation, but can only be recognized by an immediate insight. (emphasis added) 21
Here, we seem to have quite explicitly a depiction of successful analysis as sensepreserving. 22 Nevertheless, there are other Fregean texts which give a different picture.
Frege's well-known discussion of senses in [1892] , for example, outlines a considerably more fine-grained criterion of identity for thoughts, on which two sentences can express the same thought only if they are fairly-obvious synonyms. The non-triviality of Frege's analyses mean that on this latter conception, analysis cannot in general be intended to preserve sense. That we should strictly-speaking not use the word "definition" in such cases is clear: for
Frege, definitions strictly so-called are stipulative. But why call these expressions of analysis "axioms"? Frege's idea here is presumably the simple one that the equivalence between analysans and analysandum expressed in such a statement is one that is not susceptible of demonstration; it is "axiomatic" in the sense of an unprovable truth, one that is recognizable only on the basis of, as Frege puts it, "immediate insight."
Might Frege also mean, by referring to the analysis as an "axiom," what Hodges has suggested, namely that it expresses new content not already contained in the propositions involving the analysanda, so that it must be counted amongst the premises of 24 Frege's project is most-easily described if one keeps to the more coarse-grained of his identity-criteria, and hence with the idea (as expressed in the [1914] passage) that analysis preserves sense. Then we can say that a proof of the analysans demonstrates the logical grounds of the analysandum because analysans is analysandum. Speaking alternatively in accordance with the more fine-grained criterion of sense-identity, one must say that the proof of the analysans demonstrates the logical grounds of the analysandum because of a less-strict equivalence between the two, one which is at least as strong as logical equivalence. Hodges is right to point out that my tendency in [1996] to describe the project in the first way is under-determined by the texts. The difficulty with this proposal as an interpretation of Frege is that no Fregean proof includes such a biconditional. Frege's analytic definitions never appear in his proofs. As he says explicitly, and as his procedure uniformly exhibits, the work of analysis is preparatory: it takes place before the proofs proper. This is a crucial point for (P1) and (P2) would be false; he would have shown rather that (SUM) follows from those premises together with a new axiom. And so on. In short, Hodges' "new axioms" reading of Frege's analyses seems to be contradicted both by Frege's practice and by his explicit discussion of that practice.
5.iii What Frege Does and Doesn't Say
Hodges notes two important aspects of Frege's texts, both of which might be taken to conflict with the idea that Frege views conceptual analysis as a means of drawing out logically-relevant features of the contents of non-logical terms. The first of these is that Frege's own proposed method for demonstrating independence gives no role to conceptual analysis. The second is the fact that Frege does not discuss conceptual analysis in his replies to Hilbert. We'll take these in turn.
In [1906] , Frege briefly sketches out a proposal for demonstrating independence.
27
The central idea of the proposal turns on a mapping µ from terms of a language L to terms of L, one which preserves syntactic type 28 and maps "logical" terms to themselves.
L is fully interpreted, and is "logically perfect" just in the sense that each well-formed 27 [1906] §iii, esp pp 426-8 ([1894] 337-9) . 28 So that e.g. terms for first-level functions of one argument are mapped to the same, etc.
sentence expresses a determinate thought. The mapping µ will induce a map µ′ from sentences to sentences. Given a set P of premise-sentences all expressing truths, and a conclusion-sentence C expressing a truth, we then assess the independence of C from P by looking at the set P′ of sentences to which the members of P are mapped by µ′, and the sentence C′ to which C is mapped by µ′. If each member of P′ expresses a truth, while C′ expresses a falsehood, then our original C (and the thought it expresses) is independent of the set P (and the set of thoughts expressed by its members).
Frege follows his sketch with the warning that "it still needs more precise formulation," and that difficult questions remain to be answered. But he never returns to the issue.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the proposed test itself is that it can be used to demonstrate "independence" only in the sense of "formal independence," which is to say that it can show just that C can't be derived from P via the kinds of purely-formal laws of logic that both Frege and Hilbert employ in the course of proof. It cannot show, generally speaking, that C is independent of P in the sense discussed above, which is to say that no further conceptual analysis will reveal highly-analyzed equivalents C* and P*, the first of which is provable from the second. In cases in which this kind of further conceptual analysis is possible, Frege's proposed test will fail in exactly the same way that Hilbert's test fails. Indeed, the two are essentially equivalent, as applied to a fully-interpreted language of the kind discussed by Frege. There are two ways of making sense of Frege's proposal, given the surrounding body of work. The first is to suppose that Frege had in mind the application of his independence-test in a very restricted area, specifically to languages whose non-logical terminology is, as above, "fully analyzed." The difficulty of spelling out this condition of complete analysis is perhaps part of what Frege has in mind when he notes that a "more precise formulation" of his proposal is still needed. 30 The second is that Frege is confused here, and specifically that he has briefly confused the purely-formal character of the fundamental laws of logic (which he acknowledges) with the considerably-stronger requirement of the purely-formal character of logical implication (which he generally denies).
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However we explain the odd 1906 proposal, it must be said that Frege himself seems not to have been happy with it. He never follows up on either the proposal or the open questions surrounding it, and by 1910 seems to have concluded that independence cannot be demonstrated. In Frege's notes to Jourdain of 1910, we find:
30 [1906] 429 ([1984] 339). 31 In this vein, see Frege's curious note about his proposal that: "One might call it an emanation of the formal nature of logical laws" ([1906] 427/[1984] 337). The fundamental logical laws clearly are "formal" for Frege, in that they apply independently of the contents of non-logical terms. But this does not imply, of course, that the logical relations, e,g. entailment, are formal in this sense. (For, as is clear in the logicist reduction, the fact that the thought expressed by a sentence S is logically entailed by the thoughts expressed by a set of premise-sentences P is not reducible to the formal derivability of S from P.) While the formal nature of entailment (which formality Frege rejects) would underwrite the proposed 1906 test, the formal nature of the laws (which formality he accepts) would underwrite such a test only for a fully-analyzed language.
The indemonstrability of the axiom of parallels cannot be proved. If we do this apparently, we use the word 'axiom' in a sense quite different from that which is handed down to us. Cf. my essays 'On the Foundations of Geometry'...
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Frege's reader is referred here, presumably, not to the brief positive proposal at the end of the second essay, but rather to the discussion constituting the bulk of both essays referenced, i.e., to the criticism of Hilbert. That the second essay referred to contains the outline of a positive solution to the question of independence-demonstrations is not even mentioned. Similarly, the posthumously-published "Logic in Mathematics," written in 1914, contains a rehearsal of the early criticism of Hilbert's independence-proofs, and no mention of the 1906 proposal.
In short, the brief discussion of independence in section iii of [1906] is certainly odd. It is difficult, however, to see in this discussion a coherent reason for taking Frege to have a serious or sustained view of the logical relations on which entailment, consistency, and independence are to be understood purely formally.
The final textual issue of this section concerns Frege's silence about conceptual analysis in his replies to Hilbert. Hodges takes the following view:
The fact that in the whole correspondence with Hilbert and the sixty-odd pages of [[1903] ] and [[1906] ] Frege never once says that he finds Hilbert's independence proofs unacceptable because they ignore the possibilities of conceptual analysis is one strong argument against Blanchette's thesis.
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I don't agree. The crucial difference between Frege and Hilbert, as I have argued,
is that the relation of logical entailment that concerns Frege is sensitive to the meanings of non-logical terms, while the relation of logical entailment that concerns Hilbert is not.
The reason for discussing conceptual analysis, here and in [1996] , is that Frege's use of conceptual analysis illustrates how, exactly, these meanings and their relationships are brought to bear in Frege's positive demonstrations of logical entailment. But there is no reason for Frege himself to engage in, or to discuss, conceptual analysis in his 32 Frege [1980] 183n. For an enlightening discussion of this passage and its relation to the 1906 text, including an argument that Frege is not, in 1910, expressing the blanket rejection of independence-proofs suggested here, see Tappenden [2000] . 33 Hodges [2004] Before looking at Frege's answer, let's fix some terms. Where Σ is a set of sentences as above, and taking as given a particular one of Hilbert's re-interpretations involving the real numbers:
-Let T G be the set of thoughts expressed by Σ when its terms take their ordinary geometric senses. Thus T G will be a set of what Frege calls "axioms of geometry." We'll need to refer below also to the conjunction of these thoughts; call this conjunction "∧T G ."
-Let T R be the set of thoughts expressed by Σ when its terms take Hilbert's assigned meanings. T R is therefore, as Frege would put it, a set of thoughts about the real numbers. Similarly, ∧T R .
-Let T ∃ be the existential thought expressed by the result of conjoining Σ's members and existentially quantifying over the geometric terms. This last thought essentially says that there is some series of concepts, relations, etc. that will satisfy the schematicallyunderstood Σ.
As above, Hilbert's re-interpretation immediately shows (assuming the truth of the background theory) that T R 's members are all true, hence that T R is consistent, and further that T ∃ is true and hence consistent. Frege's question is whether we can infer the consistency of T G from these results. And his answer is a resounding "no." 41 In the January 1900 letter to Hilbert, referring to T ∃ as a "general proposition" and each of its 39 Assuming the truth of the background theory of real arithmetic. 40 See e.g. [1906] 402 ([1984] 332-3, the letter to Hilbert of January 6, 1900 ([1980 43ff). 41 "…Mr. Hilbert appears to transfer the independence putatively proved of his pseudoaxioms to the axioms proper… This would seem to constitute a considerable fallacy. And all mathematicians who think that Mr. Hilbert has proved the independence of the real axioms from one another have surely fallen into the same error." ([1906] 402 ([1984] 333)).
instances, e.g. ∧T R and ∧T G as the "particular propositions…contained in it," Frege writes:
If a general proposition contains a contradiction, then so does any particular proposition that is contained in it. Thus if the latter is free from contradiction, we can infer that the general proposition is free from contradiction, but not conversely.
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The first point is straightforward: if T ∃ is inconsistent, then every instance of it, including T R and T G , will be as well. So if either of these special cases has been shown consistent (as indeed one of them has by Hilbert), we can conclude that T ∃ itself is consistent. The second point (the "not conversely") contains the disagreement with Hilbert: the consistency of T ∃ does not imply the consistency of T G .
Similarly in the same letter, referring to instances like T R and T G as "special geometries" and the generalized T ∃ as a "general axiom," Frege says:
[G]iven that the axioms in special geometries are all special cases of general axioms, one can conclude from lack of contradiction in a special geometry to lack of contradiction in the general case, but not to lack of contradiction in another special case.
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As above: from the consistency of T R , we can straightforwardly infer the consistency of T ∃ . But -and here again is the source of disagreement with Hilbert -we cannot infer the consistency of T G from that of T R .
A similar sentiment appears in Frege's letter to Liebmann in the same year (1900), in which Frege discusses the equivalent question of independence: 44 now show lack of contradiction by examples; but only in this wider area; for from lack of contradiction in a more comprehensive area we cannot infer lack of contradiction in a narrower area… 45 Why does Frege take it that the consistency of T R and of T ∃ is insufficient to guarantee the consistency of the very-similar T G ? It is worth noting here that from Hilbert's point of view, the inference in question -i.e. from the consistency of the axioms as interpreted over the reals to their consistency as interpreted over geometric entities -is entirely unproblematic. For as far as Hilbert is concerned, the consistency-question has to do with what these two "special cases" have in common, namely the overarching structure exemplified by each, and described by the set Σ when its terms are taken schematically.
But if the above account of Frege is correct, the crucial point is that the consistencyquestion for T G does not have to do just with the form shared by T G and T R , and described by T ∃ . It has to do additionally with what distinguishes T G from T R , namely the specific geometric concepts, objects, and relations with which T G is concerned.
Frege completes the sentence we've left hanging above as follows:
…from lack of contradiction in a more comprehensive area we cannot infer lack of contradiction in a narrower area; for contradictions might enter in just because of the restriction (emphasis added).
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You can't infer the consistency of T G from that of T ∃ , or of T R , since the specific subjectmatter (the "restriction") introduced by T G may well give rise to contradiction. A similar sentiment is expressed by Frege in his earlier "On Formal Theories of Arithmetic." Here Frege is discussing different "special cases" of a set of schematically-understood arithmetical rules, one of which is obtained by -as we would put it -interpreting those rules over the natural numbers, and the other by interpreting them over the complex domain. The question is whether the consistency (or the truth) of the former set of thoughts entails the consistency of the latter:
45 Letter to Liebmann of 29 July 1900, Frege [1980] 91. 46 Ibid.
A proof of non-contradictoriness, then, cannot be given by saying that these rules have been proved as laws for the positive whole numbers and therefore must be without contradiction; for after all, they might conflict with the peculiar properties of the higher numbers, e.g. that of yielding -1 when squared. And in fact, not all rules can be retained... It is therefore evident that in virtue of the peculiar nature of the complex higher numbers there may arise a contradiction where so far as the positive whole numbers are concerned, no contradiction obtains.
47
I take it that Frege's point is clear: we can introduce a contradiction in the move from T R to T G simply in virtue of the move from one subject-matter to another. For as always, for
Frege, the question of whether a contradiction follows from a collection of thoughts will depend in part on the subject-matter of those thoughts. It will depend, that is, on the senses had by the non-logical terms of the sentences in question.
Conclusion
When we ask whether a set of sentences (or the set of thoughts expressed by them) is consistent, there are a number of different things we might mean. Following
Hilbert, we might be enquiring about the existence of an interpretation of the non-logical terms which will satisfy each of the sentences. Or we might be interested in the kind of formal consistency that follows immediately from the existence of such an interpretation.
Following Frege on the other hand, we might be interested in whether a contradiction is logically entailed by the specific set of thoughts expressed. 
